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THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS UNDER THE
1970 CONSTITUTION
by

STANLEY M. JOHNSTON*

INTRODUCTION

Although the size and structure of the General Assembly and
the basic stream of the legislative process remain much the same,
there have been numerous changes affecting the legislative function as a result of the adoption of the 1970 Constitution. Perhaps
the changes with the greatest impact pertain to the annual session and special session provisions. The power to call special sessions, formerly a prerogative of the Governor,' has been extended to the leadership of the General Assembly as well. 2 In
addition, provision is now included for special sessions of the
Senate alone. 3 Moreover, annual sessions of the General Assembly, which were developing in the last few years prior to the
4
new constitution, are mandatory under the 1970 Constitution.
These changes hastened the growth of a "continuous assembly."
The most novel change to the legislative process provided
by the 1970 Constitution was the introduction of the amendatory
veto concept to Illinois. 5 This process has been instrumental in
resolving minor differences arising between the General Assembly and the Governor regarding the substance of a bill.
Examination of these provisions 'and other constitutional
changes to the legislative process is the purpose of this article.
First, the birth and impact of the continuous assembly will be
analyzed. Second, the revision of bills by veto will be discussed
with special emphasis on the amendatory veto procedure. And
last, a synopsis of other changes affecting the legislative process
will be provided. Only through this examination can the problem now confronting both legislators and attorneys-coping
with the new legislative process-be fully appreciated.
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 1966. Mr. Johnston is a
senior bill drafter in the Legislative Reference Bureau, Springfield, Illinois, and has been employed by that department since 1968.
1. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8 (1870).
2. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b) (1970).

3. Id.
4. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a) (1970).
5. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e) (1970).
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THE CoNiNuous ASSEMBLY

Annual Sessions
The 1870 Constitution provided that "sessions of the General
Assembly shall commence at twelve o'clock noon on the Wednesday next after the first Monday in January, in the year next
ensuing the election of members thereof

6

"....

Succeeding

General Assemblies religiously followed the 1870 Constitution
and subsequently adjourned sine die on or before the first June
30 of their respective biennia. As a result, the legislature was
not a continuous assembly. In fact it was normally in session
only six months every other year. But the Seventy-fifth (19671968 biennium) and the Seventy-sixth (1969-1970 biennium)
General Assemblies broke this pattern by reconvening briefly on
several occasions after the first six months of their respective
biennia. The Constitutional Convention recognized this developing trend toward extended legislative sessions, resulting in the
new provision that the General Assembly shall convene an7
nually.

Section 5(a) of article IV of the new constitution specifies
that the "General Assembly shall be a continuous body during
the term for which members of the House of Representatives
are elected." This was surely not intended to mean that its
members could never adjourn, but the Seventy-eighth General
Assembly was in session at some time in 17 of its first 20 months.
During the months in which it was not in session it left stacks
of bills on the Governor's desk for action. Bills passed by the
legislature are required to be presented to the Governor within
30 calendar days after passage, and he is then allowed 60 calendar days in which to act.8 This means that the legislative process
is continuing up to 90 days after the adjournment of the legis6. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (1870).
7. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a) (1970) provides:

The General Assembly shall convene each year on the second
Wednesday of January. The General Assembly shall be a continuous body during the term for which members of the House of Representatives are elected.
8. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (1970), which in relevant part provides:
(a) Every bill passed by the General Assembly shall be presented to the Governor within 30 calendar days after its passage. The
foregoing requirement shall be judicially enforceable. If the Governor approves the bill, he shall sign it and it shall become law.
(b) If the Governor does not approve the bill, he shall veto
it by returning it with his objections to the house in which it originated. Any bill not so returned by the Governor within 60 calendar
days after it is presented to him shall become law. If recess or adjournment of the General Assembly prevents the return of a bill, the
bill and the Governor's objections shall be filed with the Secretary
of State within such 60 calendar days. The Secretary of State shall
return the bill and objections to the originating house promptly upon
the next meeting of the same General Assembly at which the bill
can be considered.
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lature. This is in contrast to the pre-1968 condition in which
the legislatures concluded their actions in the first half of the
biennium and the statutory law settled down for a year and a
half of predictability between sessions.
This enormous expansion of the time of legislative sessions
arising from the mandate for annual sessions under the new constitution has a number of important ramifications. First is its
impact on the membership of the General Assembly. The parttime legislator of the six-months-every-other-year General Assembly is hard pressed to find time for the increasing demands
of his office. Consequently, the legislature is moving in the direction of a full-time commitment with appropriate adjustments
in salary to enable its members to live with that commitment.
Second, the recurring sessions contribute to increased interaction between the Governor and the General Assembly.
When the legislature adjourned sine die after the first six months
of its term, the Governor's vetoes were almost never overridden
because the General Assembly was usually not in session at the
time the veto was made. Now, not only is an override rendered
feasible by the recurring sessions, but it is also made easier by
the reduction of the majority required for that purpose from twothirds to three-fifths. 9 Third, the continuing legislature makes
the amendatory veto process, which will be discussed later in
this article, an effective reconciliatory device.
Finally, an important ramification pertains to the publication
of revisions of the statutes. With the statutes subject to change
at almost any time, and in fact subjected to change on a regular
basis throughout the term of the General Assembly, it is impossible to find a period of time long enough between sessions to
produce an updated version of the Illinois Revised Statutes before additional changes -are made. The 1973 edition came with
a supplement to incorporate the last two 'acts of the 1973 Regular
Session and the acts of the 1973 special sessions. Even the supplement was quickly rendered deficient by the enactment of Public Acts 78-953 and 78-954 which were rushed through in the 1974
session by February 15. In this state of affairs, it is increasingly
difficult for anyone to be assured that he has in fact consulted
the current version of any statute governing a course of action
he proposes to undertake or counsel he is being asked to provide.
9. ILL. CONST. art. IV,

§ 9(c) (1970) provides:

The house to which a bill is returned shall immediately enter
the Governor's objections upon its journal. If within 15 calendar
days after such entry that house by a record vote of three-fifths of
the members elected passes the bill, it shall be delivered immediately to the second house. If within 15 calendar days after such delivery the second house by a record vote of three-fifths of the members elected passes the bill, it shall become law.
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Special Sessions

The 1970 Constitution also changed the provisions pertaining
to special sessions. The 1870 Constitution provided that the
"Governor may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General
Assembly.. . .", but this power was used sparingly in the century
under that constitution, 0 being exercised to convene the General
Assembly so that urgent business could be considered. The 1970
Constitution gives the power to convene special sessions to the
legislative leadership as well as to the Governor."
This power
under the 1970 Constitution has been exercised more for the
purpose of controlling the scope of the legislature's deliberations
than for the purpose of convening the legislature when it would
not otherwise have been in session. The result of these two
changes provided by the 1970 Constitution has been the effective
2
creation of a continuous assembly.'
10. ILL. CONST. art. V,

§ 8 (1870).

11. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b) (1970) provides:
The Governor may convene the General Assembly or the Senate
alone in special session by a proclamation stating the purpose of the
session; and only business encompassed by such purpose, together
with any impeachments or confirmation of appointments shall be
transacted. Special sessions of the General Assembly may also be
convened by joint proclamation of the presiding officers of both
houses, issued as provided by law.
12. The Seventy-seventh General Assembly met for a spring session
from January 6 through June 30 and a fall session from October 5
through November 13 in 1971. Another long session followed from January 12 through June 30 in 1972, the first even-numbered year regular session under the new constitution. The regular session was then adjourned
to November 26 of the same year. During this period of adjournment,
the Governor exercised his power to call a special session of the General
Assembly to consider revenue sharing matters. He scheduled that special session to begin November 26, the same day the General Assembly
was already scheduled to reconvene. Thus, the regular session and the
special session ran more or less concurrently through December 17.
The current General Assembly, the Seventy-eighth, stepped up the
pace. Its first regular session began January 10, 1973 and continued past
the customary deadline of midnight on June 30 to adjourn on July 2.
The fall session began on October 15 and ran through December 1. No
fewer than five special sessions were called to coincide with meeting
dates already scheduled in the fall session. Four were adjourned at the
end of the fall session on December 1, but the first special session was
continued to run along with the regular session of 1973. Two of these
special sessions were called by the Governor and three by the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives acting
under subsection (b) of section 5 of article IV of the new constitution.
All five of these special sessions were used for the purpose of focusing
the attention of the General Assembly on some particular subject matter
rather than for the purpose of convening the scattered legislators. By the
time all five special sessions were acounted for, the scope of the legislature's consideration was broad indeed, encompassing ethics in government, the regulation of campaign practices and finances, the establishment of a State Board of Elections, sales tax relief, the state lottery, the
Regional Transportation Authority and other transportation matters,
drug abuse control programs, appropriations for debt service on school
construction bonds, the date for the Governor's submission of his budget
to the General Assembly, changes relating to the certification of school
administrators, consolidation of certain elections, transfer of functions relating to the new office of State Comptroller, correcting technical errors
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Section 5(b) of article IV of the 1970 Constitution authorizes
the Governor to call a special session of the Senate alone, but
not the House alone. Logic suggests that this was intended to
enable the Governor to convene the Senate to act on the confirmation of appointments, but it is not limited to that purpose by
the constitution. The Governor exercised this power to convene
a special session of the Senate alone on July 13, 1974 for the
limited purpose for it to consider receding from Senate Amendment No. 10 to House Bill 2303.13 The Senate did recede from
that amendment in that special session, the first of its kind.
REVISION OF BILLS BY VETO

The Amendatory Veto
The amendatory veto is an idea new to Illinois. Only four
other states allow amendatory vetoes: Alabama, 1 4 Massachusetts, 15 New Jersey, 16 and Virginia.1 7 Although these states
share this concept with Illinois, the procedures vary, thus offering little direction for interpretation of the Illinios provision.
Section 9 (e) of article IV of the 1970 Constitution provides:
The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations for change to the house in which it originated.
The bill shall be considered in the same manner as a vetoed bill
but the specific recommendations may be accepted by a record
vote of a majority of the members elected to each house. Such
bill shall be presented again to the Governor and if he certifies
that such acceptance conforms to his specific recommendations,
the bill shall become law. If he does not so certify, he shall
return it as a vetoed bill to the house in which it originated.
This procedure has been used vigorously by Governors Ogilvie and Walker, proving to be a useful method for reconciling
minor differences between the General Assembly and the Governor. In 1971, 34 bills 'became law 'by the amendatory veto process, 16 in 1972, and 31 in 1973. In each of these years, only a
in a bill already enacted, tax relief for senior citizens and disabled persons, reduced transit fares for children and the aged, county election
costs, and residence requirements for the Chicago Board of Education.
The 1974 regular session of the Seventy-eighth General Assembly
ran from January 9, past June 30 again, to July 12 and adjourned leaving an important appropriation bill unpassed. The Senate made numerous amendments to the measure, a House bill, and returned it to the
House and adjourned before the House considered the Senate amendments. The House refused to concur in one of the amendments and then
it too adjourned. The Governor then called a special session of the Senate alone on July 13 for them to further consider the bill. Note 13 infra
& accompanying text.
13. S. Joun. ILL., 78th Gen. Assembly, 1st Spec. Sess. 1(1974).
14. ALA. CONST. art. 5, § 125.
15. MASS. CONST. amend. art. LVI, § 186.
16. N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
17. VA. CONST. art. V, § 6.
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half dozen or so bills for which the Governor proposed changes
by this process were rejected by the legislature and thus failed
to become law.
The amendatory veto has been used to provide a wide variety
of changes: to resolve conflicts between two bills passed at the
same session, to correct an inadvertant omission in a bill, to defer
salary increases because a Federal wage-price freeze was imposed
between the time of its passage and the time of the Governor's
action, and to change the agency charged with the administration
of the Act. However, this procedure has created two problems
which have been only partially resolved. First is the question
of when a bill is "passed" which in turn controls the effective
date of the law. The second problem pertains to the scope of
the Governor's authority under section 9 (e) of article IV in making specific recommendations for change to a bill.
Date of Passage
A bill subjected to the amendatory veto process could arguably be considered passed on one of two dates. Date of passage
could be the date on which a bill was passed by both houses
of the General Assembly and initially presented to the Governor
for his 'approval. Alternatively, date of passage could be the date
on which the Governor's recommended changes to a bill are accepted by majority vote in both houses and returned to him for
certification.
The Supreme Court of Illinois resolved the question in People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett.' The case involved Senate Bills
1195, 1196 and 1197 which were passed by both houses of the
Seventy-seventh General Assembly and were subsequently returned by the Governor with specific recommendations for
change. Relying on the definition of "passage" in Board of Education v. Morgan,19 a 1925 case in which the Illinois Supreme
Court did not face the complex options offered by the 1970 Constitution, the court held that the date of passage is the date on
which the legislature votes to approve the Governor's specific
recommendations for change pursuant to the authority of section
9(e) of article IV of the 1970 Constitution. 20 Bills not subject
to the amendatory veto process are "passed" on the date of the
last legislative act prior to presentation to the Governor. The
court ,reasoned that:
Any other definition of the word "passed" which fixed an earlier
time would require this court to rule that the bills were passed
18. 50 Ill. 2d 242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972).
19. 316 Ill. 143, 147 N.E. 34 (1925).
20. 50 Ill. 2d 242, 248, 278 N.E.2d 84, 87.

1975]

The Legislative Process

before the legislature ever considered them in their final form,
indeed before they were written. Nothing in the constitution of
1970 suggested that the word
"passed" was used in such an arti21
ficial and abnormal sense.
With this question resolved, we should examine its impact
on the effective date of laws. The constitution encourages the
conclusion of the principal legislative sessions on June 30 by requiring an extraordinary majority (three-fifths) for enacting
legislation to take effect immediately in the last half of the calendar year.22 But since the Governor is allowed sixty days for
the consideration of bills,23 most of the consideration of bills subjected to amendatory vetoes will occur in the last half of the
calendar year. As a result, and although the Klinger holding
seems correct, part of the purpose of the amendiatory veto process
is defeated. The problem with the definition of "passage"
adopted by the court is that it requires acceptance of the Governor's recommendations for change be made, in many cases, by
a three-fifths vote in order to take effect at the time intended
by the legislature. This result is clearly at odds with the plain
language of the amendatory veto provisions and the concept of
reconciling differences between the Governor and the General
Assembly by a simple majority (the three-fifths requiremnt is
the majority required to override the Governor's recommendations). That the amendatory veto procedure is frustrated in part
by Klinger is illustrated by this exchange from the debates of
the Constitutional Convention:
Mr. Knuppel: Of course, you have limited it to specific.
Now, one other question-or two other questions. Do you really
believe that this is so clear that no doubt could exist that only
a majority vote is required and then of each house?
Mr. Orlando: Well, Mr. Knuppel, if you are referring to the
amendment that you have submitted there to make it express,
the intention is that a majority of both houses is required rather
than three-fifths
under the new formula, and I would not have
24
any objection.
The General Assembly responded to the Klinger case by enacting Public Act 78-85 which added section 3 to "An Act in rela21. Id.

22. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (1970)

provides:

The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform effective date for laws passed prior to July 1 of a calendar year. The
General Assembly may provide for a different effective date in any
law passed prior to July 1. A bill passed after June 30 shall not
become effective prior to July 1 of the next calendar year unless the
General Assembly by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected
to each house provides for an earlier effective date.
23. Note 8 supra.

24. REC. OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL
batim Transcripts, vol. III at 1357 (1969-70).

CONVENTION

Ver-
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tion to the effective date of laws."

This section reads as follows:

For purposes of determining the effective dates of laws, a
bill is "passed" at the time of its final legislative action prior to
presentation to the Governor pursuant to paragraph (a) of Ar25
ticle IV of the Constitution.
This Act, however, has encountered resistance. One Illinois appellate court followed the rule set forth in Klinger when it was
required to determine the effective date of Public Act 78-939 in
People v. Zayas. 26 The court's opinion makes no reference to
the 'attempt of the legislature to redefine "passage" in Public Act
78-85. Also, when the question of the effective date of the capital
punishment bill, Public Act 78-921, was presented to the Attorney General, his opinion considered Public Act 78-85, but concluded that "passage" as defined in that Act must include the
acceptance of the Governor's recommendations for change because any other conclusion would be unconstitutional under the
27
Klinger case.
Scope of the Governor'sAuthority
"The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations for change.. .. 28 What is the scope of the Governor's authority for recommending changes to a bill? Is the
Governor limited to making merely technical changes, or are substantive recommendations allowable?
As the Klinger court
properly noted, neither the constitutional language nor the committee reports or convention debates provide much assistance in
29
defining the scope of the Governor's authority.
In Klinger, the Governor's recommendations for change required the 'amendment of the title of the bill and the deletion
of the entire text after the enacting clause with the substitution
of an entirely new bill. Although this was not the controlling
issue in the case, the court concluded, ,by way of dictum, that
the substitution of entirely new bills was not authorized by the
constitution. The court has thus provided one limitation to the
scope of the Governor's authority, but the lingering uncertainty
25. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 131, § 3 (1973).
26. 17 Ill. App. 3d 390, 308 N.E.2d 147 (1974).
27. ILL. Op. ATT'Y GEN., S-725 (March 21, 1974). For a statement of
the weight which should be given to Attorney General's opinions, see 70
ILL. Op. ATT'Y GEN. at x (1971), which provides:
8. All opinions of the Attorney General are advisory only and
are not binding on the State of Illinois or the courts of this State.
9. For a particularly difficult and important problem of law, officials should resort to a declaratory judgment action wherever possible.
28. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e) (1970).
29. 50 Ill. 2d 242, 248, 278 N.E.2d 84, 87-88.
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as to the parameters of his authority is evidenced by this passage
from the opinion:
Our examination of the records of the Convention shows that
the following terms were used to describe the kinds of 'specific
recommendations for change' that were contemplated: 'corrections'; 'precise correction'; 'technical flaws'; 'simple deletion'; 'to clean up the language'. In response to the following
question put by Delegate Netsch, however, 'Then was it the
Committee's thought that the conditional veto would be available only to correct technical errors?' a committee member
answered, 'No, Ma'am'.
Upon the basis of the imprecise text of the constitutional
provision and the materials before us in this case, we cannot now
attempt to delineate the exact kinds of changes that fall within
the power of the Governor to make specific recommendations for
change. It can be said with certainty, however, that the substiin the present case, is
tution of complete new bills, as attempted
30
not authorized by the constitution.
Defeat of a ConstitutionalAmendment
These two problems arising from the implementation of the
amendatory veto process in Illinois have not been satisfactorily
resolved. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did resolve
the date of passage dilemma presented in Klinger, further complications, as discussed above, remain. However, the question of
the scope of the Governor's authority in suggesting recommendations for change to a bill is not only undefined, but is also perplexing. The constitutional language expressing the Governor's
authority is both vague and unworkable. Moreover, the court
in Klinger, by way of dictum, merely placed an upper limit on
an otherwise unstructured definition of this autority. Consequently, this second problem obstructs the effective utilization
of the amendatory veto process.
An attempt was made by the legislature to clarify the constitutional language and at the same time further restrict the Governor's authority. A proposed constitutional amendment was
placed before the electorate at the general election on November
5, 1974. The amendment to section 9 (e) of article IV would have
limited the specific recommendations for change which the Governor could make to a bill to "the correction of technical errors
or matters of form." This amendment, however, was not approved by the electorate (see the Appendix for the majority required for the approval of a constitutional amendment). Even
if the amendment had been approved, it would have only transferred the argument concerning the Governor's authority from
30. Id. at 249, 278 N.E.2d at 88.
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how sweeping his recommendations for change can be to how
extensive "technical errors or matters of form" may be. Although
the amendatory veto concept was a creative addition to Illinois'
legislative process, clarification is needed for it to reach its full
potential in effectiveness.
Item and Reduction Vetoes
Section 9(d) of article IV provides two special veto procedures applicable to appropriation bills. The item veto remains
approximately the same as it was under the 1870 Constitution
except that the majority required to restore a vetoed item has
been reduced from two-thirds to three-fifths. The Governor may
also reduce the amount of any item of appropriations in a bill,
but the amount reduced may be restored to the original amount
31
by the vote of a majority of the members of each house.
In Senate Bill 698 of the Seventy-eighth General Assembly
an appropriation was made to the Illinois Junior College Board
as follows:
For distribution as flat rate grants for instructional programs to
junior college districts maintaining a recognized junior college
at the uniform rate of $18.50 per semester hour equivalent carried through each mid-term by students who are residents of this
State ..........
$63,825,000.
The Governor's reduction veto exercised under the authority
of section 9(d) of article IV of the constitution purported to reduce the amount of $63,825,000 to $59,697,900, a legitimate use
of the reduction veto. It also proposed, under the same authority, to reduce the flat grant rate from $18.50 per semester hour
to $17.61 per semester hour.8 2 The Attorney General concluded
that the flat grant rate was not an item of appropriations and
therefore its reduction was not possible under the reduction veto
process, that the attempt to reduce the rate in that manner did
not constitute the submission of specific recommendations for
change under the amendatory veto provisions, and that the bill
83
became law with the amount, but not the rate, being reduced.
Therefore, reduction of the flat grant rate requires reliance on
the amendatory veto procedure which was designed to effect a
change of this nature, limiting the reduction veto process to the
reduction of amounts appropriated.
31. The corresponding provision in the 1870 Constitution is section 16

of article V.
32. S. JoUR. ILL., vol. III at 3363-64 (1973).
33. ILL. Op. Arr'y GEN., 5-630 (October 11, 1973).
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ADDITIONAL

CONSTITUTIONAL

CHANGES IN

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Requirements for an ExtraordinaryMajority
There are several changes in the requirements for an extraordinary majority under the 1970 Constitution. The direction of
these changes suggests something of the spirit of the new constitution in that it is now more difficult for the legislature to close
its sessions to the public and for a minority to frustrate the will
of the majority with respect to vetoes. A table in the Appendix
lists the voting requirements provided by both the 1870 and 1970
constitutions.
The Transcriptionof Debates
Each house is now required to keep a transcript of its debates
and to make the transcripts available to the public. 84 Accordingly, debates in both houses of the General Assembly have been
recorded since the beginning of the Seventy-eighth General Assembly. Public Act 78-1137, approved August 26, 1974, provides
for the transcripts of those recordings to be filed with the Secretary of State as 'a public record. As a result of this procedure,
transcripts will offer a new source of evidence of legislative intent to aid in the interpretation of statutes.
The transcription of debates is 'apparently leading to the
demise of the long-standing legislative custom of stopping the
clock before midnight on June 30. Resort to this custom permitted the legislature to conclude business prior to the onset of the
extraordinary majority requirements 'as to the effective date of
bills passed after June 30. Now, 'because of the recordation of
debates, the extraordinary majority requirement of section 10,
article IV is not so easily circumvented since the public record
will show at what time the business was conducted. This probably
contributed to the extension of the two most recent spring sessions
beyond June 30 so that all business could be finished. The
impact of this new requirement is diminished, however, by the
reduction of the majority required from two-thirds to threefifths to give a bill, passed after June 30, an effective date of
law before the next July 1.
Special Legislation
Section 22 of article IV of the 1870 Constitution began "The
General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of
34. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 7(b) (1970) provides:
Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and a transcript of its debates. The journal shall be published and the transcript shall be available to the public.
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the following enumerated cases" and proceeded to set forth a
long "laundry list" of matters in which special legislation was
prohibited, concluding with "in all other cases where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
Section 13 of article IV of the 1970 Constitution covers special
legislation in these words:
The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a
general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for
judicial determination.
Although the "laundry list" is omitted, the substance of the provision is the same. Therefore, the criteria established under the
1870 Constitution will be applied with the court making the final
determination as to whether an act violates the restrictions
against special legislation. In People ex rel. East Side Levee and

Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee and Sanitary District,
the court emphasized its role in making this determination:
As we recently pointed out in Bridgewater v. Hotz (1972), 51
Ill. 2d 103, and in Grace v. Howlett (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 478, the
criteria developed under the earlier constitution for determining
whether a law is local or special are still valid, but the deference
previously accorded the legislative judgment whether a general
law could be made applicable has been largely eliminated by the
addition in Section 13 of the
provision that this 'shall be a matter
35
for judicial determination.'
The court applied these criteria to prohibit special legislation pertaining to a certain sanitary district, even though sanitary districts were among the municipal corporations to which the prohibition against local or special legislation in the 1870 Constitu36
tion was held inapplicable.

Other Drafting Considerations
The 1970 Constitution set forth the following drafting requirements:
Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification,
revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject. Appropriation bills shall be limited to the subject of appropriations.
A bill expressly amending a law shall set forth completely
the sections amended. ... 37
A comparison of this provision with the corresponding 1870 constitutional provision shows that the one subject rule has been
retained, but with the stated exceptions.3 8 Revisory bills are
35. 54 Ill. 2d 442, 447, 298 N.E.2d 177, 179-80 (1973).
36. Id.
37. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d) (1970).
38. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1870).
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utilized to consolidate all sections amended more than once in
the preceding year into a single bill, several pages long, simplifying the handling of this routine project by the legislature. The
prohibition against amendment by reference without setting
forth the section amended was retained by the new constitution.
In contrast to the 1870 provision, the subject of an act is no longer
required to be expressed in the title which reduces the emphasis
on long "table of contents" titles.3 9 An additional change provided by the 1970 Constitution is that the emergency clause for
imposing an immediate effective date is no longer required. The
text of an act now needs only to recite the date on which it is
40
to take effect without setting forth any grounds or reasons.
Appropriation bills are now limited to the subject of appropriations. Although "appropriation bill" is not defined, this provision has led to the abandonment of the procedure of tacking
an appropriation for the costs of a certain project or commission,
for example, onto the bill establishing or 'authorizing it. These
related appropriations are reserved to separate bills.
Amending the Legislative Article
One of the new provisions of the 1970 Constitution is contained in section 3 of article XIV. Recognizing the natural conflict of interest which might inhibit legislators from proposing
needed changes in the structure of the legislature or in the legislative process, the new constitution provides that amendments
to the legislative article may be proposed by a petition signed
by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the total votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the
preceding election. One attempt has already been made to propose an amendment under this provision. The proposed amendment would have terminated cumulative voting for members of
the House of Representatives and would have had the representatives elected from single member districts. However, the sponsors of the proposal failed to secure enough signatures by the
deadline for filing.
Proposals for amendments of the legislative article which
have been introduced in the General Assembly reflect some of
the problems about which legislators are particularly
concerned. 4 1 As discussed previously, one of these proposals,
39. For a discussion of the one subject rule and title requirements
under the 1870 and 1970 constitutions, see Comment, State Statutes: The
One Subject Rule under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 359 (1973).
40. Note 22 supra.
41. Some of these proposed amendments would provide for single
member House districts (H.R.J. Res.-C.A. 31 78th Gen. Assembly), eliminate cumulative voting (H.R.J. Res.-C.A. 29 78th Gen. Assembly), abolish the House and constitute the Senate as a unicameral legislature (S.J.
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pertaining to the amendatory veto procedure, was not approved
42
by the electorate.
CONCLUSION:

COPING WITH THE INCREASED WORK LOAD

The acceleration of change in the statutory law is keeping
pace with the changes in all areas of our lives, leading to the
condition described by Alvin Toffler as "future shock. ' 43 The
pace of this change may be illustrated by the events in the his-

tory of House Bill 2485. The Seventy-seventh General Assembly
passed this bill and sent it to the Governor. The bill provided
-for preferential placement of incumbents' names on primary ballots for the office of representative or senator in the General
Assembly. The Governor vetoed House Bill 2485 on December
10, 1971. The General Assembly overrode the veto on January
13, 1972, and the bill became law as Public Act 77-1804. Then
on January 14, 1972, the United States District Court held the
Act to be unconstitutional. 44 This synopsis points out how rapidly the status of a bill or a law can change.
Not only is the rate of statutory change increasing, but the
volume of change is increasing 'as well. The Illinois Revised Statutes now include almost six million words. The volume of
words included in sections -added or amended in a biennium is
now in the order of one-third. During the term of each General
Assembly hundreds of sections are amended by more than one
Act, thus creating problems of interpretation during the period
before a revisory bill consolidating the multiple forms of each
section is enacted and published.
The General Assembly has taken many steps to help its
members effectively adjust to its constantly increasing work
load. Each house divides its membership into numerous
committees which conduct an intensive study of bills in special
areas. In addition, the two houses combine to create joint commissions to consider specific areas of legislative interest. These
committees and commissions are now afforded increased support
by the employment of staff members having professional education and experience in their respective special areas of responsibility.
Res. 14 78th Gen. Assembly; H.R.J. Res.-C.A. 9 77th Gen. Assembly),
limit or eliminate the amendatory veto (H.R.J. Res.-C.A. 7 78th Gen. Assembly; S.J. Res. 56, S.J. Res. 66, H.R.J. Res.-C.A. 10, H.R.J. Res.-C.A.
11 77th Gen. Assembly), limit the scope of legislative business in even-

numbered years (S.J. Res. 60, H.R.J. Res.-C.A. 1 78th Gen. Assembly;
S.J. Res. 78 77th Gen. Assembly), limit the scope of legislative business

after June 30 in any year (S.J. Res. 82 78th Gen. Assembly), and limit

the length of the session in even-numbered years (S.J. Res. 80 78th Gen.
Assembly).
42. See pages
-....
supra.
43. ALVIN TorFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
44. Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280 (1972).
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Another step taken to cope with the work load is the increasing use of modern technology. The Senate has installed an electronic voting system similar in operation to the system which
has been in use in the House for several years. The Legislative
Information System has developed and installed a computerized
bill status system which can supply the inquirer with up-to-theminute information as to the status of 'bills anywhere in the legislative process. The computer is also being used to help the Legislative Reference Bureau deal with the increasing volume of bill
drafting and is now being extended to the enrolling and engrossing operations of both houses.
However, perhaps the impact of the pace 'and volume of statutory change hits hardest on the practicing attorney, but attorneys have been confronted with this problem for many years.
In The final accounting in the Estate of A.B., 45 the New York
Surrogate in 1866 was faced with the problem of a claim filed
against the estate of an attorney who had given his client, a
widow, advice upon which she relied in settling her husband's
estate. After the settlement the client-widow discovered that the
lawyer's advice had failed to take into consideration a change
made in the statutes by the legislature in the preceding year.
She suffered a substantial loss for this reason. The court permitted the client-widow to recover from the estate of the lawyer.
The opinion discussed the responsibility of the lawyer to stay
alert to legislative changes in this passage with its still familiar
final line:
In the present case, it is impossible to impute to the testator, the
legal adviser, a want of knowledge, or of skill in his profession,
in the ordinary acceptation of such a phrase. All who knew him
could testify to his long and honorable career of laborious duty,
continued through forty years of successful practice at the bar.
The error arose from want of diligent watchfulness in respect to
legislative changes. He did not remember that it might be necessary to look at the statutes of the year before. Perhaps he had
forgotten the saying, that 'no man's life, liberty or property are
46
safe while the Legislature is in session'.
It is no longer sufficient to look at the statutes of the year
before. From this perspective it seems unlikely that the bound
volumes of statutes will ever be completely current again. The
lawyer who wishes to assure his professional reputation must
remember that the statutes are subject to almost constant change
and must take pains to see that his counsel is given with due
consideration to the most recent enactments of the legislative
process.
45. 1 Tucker 247 (N.Y. Surr. 1866).
46. Id. at 249.
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